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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
The decisions made by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the area
of labor law followed precedent and were basically unsurprising. This arti-
cle presents a digest of the decisions in the field during the past year for the
use of Tenth Circuit practitioners.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT'
A. Jursd'ction
In a case involving joint employers, Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital
v. NLRB, 2 one employer, a five-member Board of Trustees (Trustees) was
appointed pursuant to statute3 by the Fremont County Commissioners.
4
Under a lease agreement, the Trustees agreed to lease the grounds, building
and equipment of the Memorial Hospital of Fremont County in return for a
nominal consideration and the management services of the Lutheran Hospi-
tals and Homes Society of America (Society), the second employer involved
in the case.
5
The American Nurses' Association (Association) was certified by the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board or the NLRB) as the bargaining
representative of the registered nurses at the hospital. The certification fol-
lowed a finding by the Board that the Society, not the Board of Trustees,
was the employer of the nurses. 6 After the election, however, the Trustees
adopted a resolution directing the Society to refrain from entering into a
collective bargaining posture with the Association. 7 The Association re-
sponded by filing an unfair labor practice charge alleging failure to bargain
in good faith under section 8(a)(5)8 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
NLRA or the Act). The Administrative Law Judge found that the Society
"controlled" the operation of the hospital9 and was the sole employer of the
hospital's registered nurses within the meaning of section 2(2) 10 of the Act.
The Board adopted his findings.
In reversing, the Tenth Circuit Court found that although the Society
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
2. 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-102 (Michie 1977).
4. 624 F.2d at 179.
5. Id
6. Id at 180.
7. Id at 181.
8. Id 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain collectively with the employees' representative.
9. 624 F.2d at 183.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) defines an "employer" for purposes of the Act as a person
other than a governmental agency, person subject to the Railway Labor Act, or any labor organi-
zation not acting as an employer.
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was a private employer, it did not retain sufficient control over the employ-
ment relationship to enter into fruitful collective bargaining because the
Trustees retained the right to approve or disapprove staffing, wage rates and
fringe benefits, employment of particular individuals, and changes in room
rates.II The Society would be unable to bargain effectively in these circum-
stances, and it could not be considered the sole employer of the nurses in the
bargaining unit. 12 The real employer, the Trustees, as a political subdivision
of the state, was not required to bargain. Therefore, the Board's order was
set aside for lack of jurisdiction.'
3
B. Election Bar
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. NLRB, 14 the propriety of the
Board's setting aside an election was at issue. The International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Workers) sought to organize produc-
tion and maintenance employees at one of the company's facilities.'
5 An
NLRB election was held in which the Workers lost. The election was set
aside by the Regional Director 16 because of two rules in the employee hand-
book that prohibited distribution of literature during working hours and al-
lowed only company-approved solicitations during working hours. '
7 After a
second election was held in which the Workers won, the company objected
to the election based on the "election bar" rule of section 9(c)(3)18 of the Act
and refused to respond to communication from the union. This, according
to the Board, was an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(l)
19
and 8(a)(5)20 of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit Court found no evidence showing that the handbook
rules were not applied properly and held that the Board had erroneously set
11. 624 F.2d at 185-86.
12. Id at 186-88.
13. Id at 188.
14. 643 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1981).
15. d at 694.
16. Id
17. One rule banned "distribution of unauthorized leaflets, papers, or other materials dur-
ing working hours on Company property." The second stated that "only the recognized solici-
tations for charitable organizations and similar activities specifically approved by the Company
will be permitted during working hours." Id
A disparate application of no-solicitation rules to various groups may violate the employees
right to self-organization. See, e.g., Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 (1975).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976) provides that no representation election shall be held if a
valid election has been held within the preceding twelve-month period.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Sec-
tion 7, the heart of the Act, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organ-
izations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 8(a)(3) is described in note 33 nfra.
20. See note 8 supra. 643 F.2d at 696.
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aside the first election. 2' The employees had been free to engage in union
activities during nonwork time at the plant and had distributed union
materials as well.
22
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Doyle commented that the rules said "work-
ing hours" not "working time" and were therefore presumptively invalid.
2 3
In addition, he deemed the evidence given by four employees, three supervi-




In NLRB v. First National Bank of Pueblo,25 the Board sought enforcement
of an order issued against the Bank after holding that the Bank had violated
the Act by interfering with the union's solicitation of employees and by dis-
charging an employee involved in union activity. 26 The sole issue on appeal
was whether the Board's conclusion was supported by substantial
evidence.
27
The court held that the Board could not use an isolated incident in
which the union was precluded from distributing leaflets to form an impor-
tant backdrop to the discharge of an employee.28 It was uncontested that
the Bank terminated the employee for an unexcused absence. The evidence
also showed that her termination occurred two and one-half months after
her union activity and that she had received a good evaluation and a merit
raise during that period of time.29 The finding that the Bank harbored the
union animus necessary to make the discharge unlawful was not supported
by the evidence, and enforcement of the Board's order was denied.
30
In NLRB v. Schlegel Oklahoma, Inc. ,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously agreed that the Board's findings of section 8(a)(l) 32 and
8(a)(3)33 violations were supported by substantial evidence. In an effort to
organize Schlegel employees, two Schlegel workers were passing out notices
of an organizational meeting on public property near the plant. The com-
pany president advised the employees to leave the "company property" and
threatened to call the police.34 There was substantial evidence that the
21. A representation election should be conducted under "laboratory conditions." General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). If an employer can show that the no-solicitation or
no-access rules did not interfere with the employees' right to organize, the election can be up-
held. Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974).
22. 643 F.2d at 696.
23. Id at 697.
24. Id at 699.
25. 623 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980).
26. Id at 687.
27. Id at 691.
28. Id at 692.
29. Id at 689-90.
30. Id at 691, 694.
31. 644 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1981).
32. See note 19 supra.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to hiring, tenure, or any other condition of employment, in
order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
34. 644 F.2d at 843.
19821
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handbilling took place on a pub/ic thoroughfare and that the president had
indeed threatened to call the police.35 "Threatening to summon law en-
forcement authorities for the purpose of inhibiting lawful union activities has
long been held violative of section 8(a)(l) of the Act."'36 Thus, the order was
enforced.
3 7
In NLRB v. Dillon Stores,38 the anti-union activities of an employee
found not to be a supervisor for purposes of voting in Board-conducted elec-
tions were imputed to the company when, during unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings, the employee was found to be a supervisor after all.39 Stating that
"[t]he purpose of determining whether an individual is a supervisor is differ-
ent in a representation proceeding than it is in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding involving interference with organizational rights . . . "40 the court
held that the discharge of the employee was unlawfully motivated and a
violation of sections 8(a)(l) 4 1 and 8(a)(3)42 of the Act.
In Hasten v. Phillips Petroleum Co ., a truckdriver, subject to the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement between his employer and the
Teamsters' Union, brought a libel suit following grievance proceedings for
statements made in a letter of discharge. 44 Article nine of the collective bar-
gaining agreement stated that an employee's discharge "must be by proper
written notice to the employee and the union."
'45
Using the "absolute privilege" theory of General Motors Corp. v.
Mendici,46 the district court granted the defendants' summary judgment
motion.4 7 The Mendicki doctrine bars libel suits based on termination or
suspension notices specifically contemplated by a collective bargaining
agreement. 48 The circuit court upheld the summary judgment ruling de-
spite the plaintiffs argument that the allegedly libelous statements were
made in a discharge letter and not during a grievance proceeding as in
Mendicki. Agreeing with the district court that the "federal policy encourag-
ing collective bargaining and frankness in labor disputes applies to termina-
35. Id
36. Id (citing NLRB v. Revlon Prod. Corp., 144 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1944)).
37. Id at 844. The Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, the necessary
standard for enforcement of the Board's order by an appeals court. Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1951).
38. 643 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
39. Id at 689-90. The Board has inconsistently applied the term "supervisor," making it
difficult to find a pattern in its decisions. See NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., 412 F.2d 324,
328 (8th Cir. 1969). Seegeneralty Note, The NLRB andSupersoqy Satw: An Explanation of Inconsis-
tent Rendts, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713 (1981).
40. 643 F.2d at 690.
41. See note 19 supra.
42. See note 33 supra.
43. 640 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1981).
44. Hasten brought suit against his employer, American Stevedoring Corp., and against
the company for which he was assigned to drive, Phillips Petroleum Co. The discharge letter
stated that Hasten was being discharged for dishonesty because he had said he could not drive
for American, had filed a Workmen's Compensation claim, and had been driving for another
company at the same time. Id. at 274-76.
45. Id. at 275 n.2.
46. 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966).
47. 640 F.2d at 275.
48. 367 F.2d at 71-72.
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tion notices as well as to bargaining sessions," 49 the court also addressed the
plaintiff's argument that state law should apply in this action.
50
Because a state tort action in libel would necessarily resolve the merits
of this labor dispute,5 1 such an action would impermissibly interfere with the
collective bargaining process according to the court. Noting the Supreme
Court guidelines52 for allowing preemption of state laws in favor of a uni-
form federal labor policy, the Tenth Circuit determined that frank state-
ments made in the course of and demanded by the collective bargaining
process should be able to be made without fear of retribution. Therefore, the
statements were within the ambit of the "unqualified privilege" doctrine of
Mendicki.53
D. Duty to Bargain
NLRB v. Barle-Collins Co. 54 dealt with the question of mandatory col-
lective bargaining. The American Flint Glass Workers of North America
(Glass Workers) had been certified in 1974 as the collective bargaining agent
for the Bartlett-Collins Company (Bartlett-Collins) employees. Unfair labor
practices filed against the company for refusal to bargain in good faith had
been upheld by an Administrative Law Judge. Against this background, the
parties met to negotiate in 1976.
5 5
Because of the prior unfair labor practice proceeding "in which there
was some question about the accuracy of testimony concerning what had
transpired" at previous bargaining meetings, Bartlett-Collins employed a
court reporter to provide an accurate transcript of the new meetings. 56 The
Glass Workers objected, saying the court reporter was "unnecessary and
costly and that his presence would create a courtroom atmosphere, induce
unnecessary speech making, and frustrate negotiations. '5 7 As an alternative,
the Glass Workers proposed that the sessions be tape-recorded and tran-
scribed.58 Bartlett-Collins refused to negotiate without a reporter present.
The Board agreed with the Glass Workers and found that Bartlett-Collins
had violated sections 8(a)(1) 59 and 8(a)(5) 60 of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the Borg-Warner stan-
dard,6 1 enforced the Board's order, accepting the Board's conclusion that the
49. 640 F.2d at 276.
50. The court identified and considered the following three factors: the potential for direct
conflict between federal labor policy and the state cause of action, the state interest in the
matter, and the similarity of issues to be decided in the federal labor case and the state action.
Id. at 277-79.
51. Id. at 279.
52. Id. at 277. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
53. 640 F.2d at 279.
54. 639 F.2d 652 (10th Cir.), cert. dentd, 101 S. Ct. 3109 (1981).




59. See note 19 supra.
60. See note 8 supra.
61. 639 F.2d at 654-55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) defines collective bargaining as the duty
of both parties to meet and confer at reasonable times and in good faith about wages, hours,
1982]
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presence of a court reporter during collective bargaining sessions does not
fall within the "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" category necessary for finding a subject mandatory for collective bar-
gaining purposes. 62 Therefore, Bartlett-Collins could not legally bargain to
impasse on the topic.
In Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 63 Lone Star Steel Company (Lone Star)
appealed an unfair labor practice ruling involving two disputed clauses64 in
a union's national agreement. Lone Star had acquired the Starlight mine
and initially operated it under a collective bargaining agreement governed
by the Bituminous Coal Operator's Association (BCOA).65 Prior to the time
the national agreement expired, the union asked Lone Star and others to
execute a memorandum agreement expressing their intent to be bound by
the terms of any successor national agreement negotiated by the union and
BCOA. Lone Star declined but offered to meet and negotiate a new con-
tract separately. 66
Lone Star, although not a member of BCOA, agreed to abide by the
provisions of the contract, only insofar as they applied to the Starlight mine
as a mine run by an independent coal operator. 67 Lone Star employees
joined in a nationwide strike when a new agreement between BCOA and the
union was not reached.6a Several weeks later, a new national agreement was
executed containing the two disputed provisions.
69
and other terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958), established that the duty to bargain is limited to mandatory subjects,
such as wages and hours, and that the parties are free not to negotiate about nonmandatory
subjects.
Examples of mandatory subjects are pay scales, incentive pay, severance pay, insurance,
and pension plans. Examples of permissive or nonmandatory subjects are performance bonds,
internal union affairs, and interests of retired employees. J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI,
H. SHERMAN, E. SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 429 (1978).
62. "The Board candidly admits that in prior cases it has, in effect, treated the issue of the
presence of a court reporter as a mandatory subject of bargaining." 639 F.2d at 657. The
NLRB has traditionally relied on adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to develop its policy.
In this instance, if the Board had had a written rule about court reporters, Bartlett-Collins
Company would have understood more clearly what the agency's policies were and would have
experienced greater procedural fairness. Se generally Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Pol/tttal Reality
Versur Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980).
63. 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
64. The "successorship clause" stated:
In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer promises
that.its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, conveyed, or otherwise
transferred or assigned to any successor without first securing the agreement of the
successor to assume the Employer's obligations under this Agreement.
The "application of contract" clause stated:
As part of the consideration for this Agreement, the Employers agree that this Agree-
ment covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal preparation
facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by any subsidiary or
affiliate at the date of this Agreement, or acquired during its term which may hereaf-
ter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production or use.
Id at 548.
65. Id at 547.
66. Id. at 547-48.
67. Id at 547 n.l.
68. Id at 548.
69. Id See note 64 supra.
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Lone Star refused to accept the conditions of the new national agree-
ment, and its Starlight mine employees continued to strike. 70 After negotia-
tions, a cooling-off period, and a resumption of the strike, Lone Star filed
unfair labor practice charges against the union alleging a violation of the
"hot cargo" provision of the Act, section 8(e), 7 1 and a failure to bargain
under sections 8(b)(4)(A)
72 and 8(b)(3). 73
The Board found that the successorship clause was not proscribed by
section 8(e) and that it would "effectively assure the survival of the Starlight
mine employees' previously negotiated wages and working conditions" and
"vitally affected the miners' terms and conditions of employment."'74 The
clause was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining, and striking was a
legal weapon.
The contract clause as applied, however, was found to be overly broad
75
and nonmandatory. Mindful of the need for deference to the Board's judg-
ment as to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, the court
nonetheless found the subject permissive because it could only affect unit
jobs if the company opened another mine; it was not a direct attack on a
problem threatening the maintenance of the basic wage structure established
by the collective bargaining agreement. 76 By striking to achieve agreement
on a nonmandatory subject, the union refused to bargain within the mean-
ing of section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 7 7 Judge Barrett, in a partial dissent, dis-
agreed with the majority that the successorship clause was a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
78
E. Unilateral Change in Working Conditions; No Deferral to Arbitration
In NLRB v. Northeast Oklahoma City Manufacturing Co. ,79 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals granted enforcement of the Board's order after con-
cluding that the company's unilateral delays in paying bonuses amounted to
a serious unfair labor practice.8 0 The company had argued that the Board's
refusal to direct deferral of the contract interpretation dispute to arbitration
constituted an abuse of discretion in view of the Board's own precedent.
8 1
70. Id
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a union
and an employer to agree that the employer will stop doing business with any other employer.
"[Tihe purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when
union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site." Drivers
Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice to
attempt to force an employer to enter into any agreement prohibited by § 8(e) with a labor
organization. See note 71 supra.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer.
74. 639 F.2d at 549.
75. Id at 558.
76. Id at 559.
77. Id
78. 639 F.2d at 559 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
79. 631 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. Id at 677.
81. Id at 673.
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Citing NLRB v. Strong8 2 and Care, v. Westinghouse Corp.,8 3 the court stated
that where the jurisdiction of the Board is invoked to adjudicate unfair labor
practice allegations arising from a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, "the Board's jurisdiction to proceed is unaffected by the exist-
ence of an arbitration clause in the parties' contract.
'8 4
F. Protected Concerted Activity
In Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 85 the court resolved the question of
whether Coors Container Company (Coors Container) interfered with the
section 7 rights8 6 of its employees by prohibiting display of a boycott sign, by
interrogating two employees about their reasons for displaying the sign, and
by disciplining the two employees.8 7 Although Coors Container employees
were not unionized and were not on strike, they had to cross the picket line
of Coors Brewery strikers in order to report to work. 88 A security guard,
acting pursuant to instructions, stopped two Coors Container employees for
displaying in their pickup truck a sign which read "Boycott Coors--Scab
Beer." 89 After refusing to remove the sign, the two employees were asked
about their union sympathies, and a heated conversation ensued. The two
employees were again quizzed by company officials the next day; one was
discharged and the other was given a verbal warning.
The court pointed out that its "function is limited to determining
whether the findings of violations are supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole."0 Although section 7 of the Act protects concerted
activity,9' Coors Container contended that special circumstances at the
plant allowed the company to prohibit distribution of union literature such
as the sign in the pickup.92 The boycott sign, however, neither disparaged
the quality of Coors beer nor ,was its display connected with a labor contro-
versy between these two employees and their employer, Coors Container.
93
The display was therefore not "indefensible" and punishable under the stan-
dard set by NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers."
By disciplining an employee for engaging in such protected activity,
Coors Container violated section 8(a)(3)95 of the Act. Recognizing that an
employer has the right to discharge or discipline an employee for "a good
reason, a bad reason or no reason at all,"' ' the court emphasized that such a
82. 393 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1969).
83. 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
84. 631 F.2d at 673.
85. 628 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1980).
86. See note 19 supra.
87. 628 F.2d at 1285.
88. Id
89. Id at 1285-86.
90. Id at 1286 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)).
91. See note 19 supra.
92. Coors Container maintained that the rule was necessary for security. 628 F.2d at 1286.
93. Id
94. 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
95. 628 F.2d at 1287. See note 33 supra.
96. 628 F.2d at 1288.
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right is restricted when union animus is present.9 7
In NLRB v. Gould, Inc. ,98 the Board's disputed findings were that Gould,
Inc. (Gould) had violated sections 799 and 8(a)(l)'oo of the Act by discharg-
ing two union officials for participating in a sympathy walkout.' 0 ' At the
time of the walkout, Gould and the union were bound by a collective bar-
gaining agreement that included a grievance procedure leading to arbitra-
tion. The contract also contained a general "no-strike" clause.1
02
An informational picket set up by the union on behalf of its construc-
tion division triggered the walkout. It was directed against a nonunion con-
tractor performing remodeling work on Gould's premises.' 0 3 Employees
represented by the manufacturing division of the union inquired as to
whether to cross the picket line. Union officials told them to make their own
decisions, and most of the morning shift employees walked out.'04 The next
day, all employees returned to work, but two were suspended pending an
investigation into their roles in what the company termed an "illegal wildcat
strike."1 05
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the refusal to cross the
picket line was protected concerted activity under section 7106 of the Act,
and it thus enforced the Board's order. 10 7 No-strike clauses are the "quid
pro quo" for arbitration clauses,' 0 8 and if the underlying dispute is arbitra-
ble, the no-strike clause is triggered.i09 Because the sympathy strike had
nothing to do with the collective bargaining agreement in effect between
97. Id See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In
Pugh, the plaintiff was fired without explanation after 32 years of employment. The appeals
court held that See's motion for nonsuit was erroneously granted by the trial court because the
plaintiff "has demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of his con-
tract of employment." Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. For an argument in favor of passage of
state statutes articulating the right of employees not to be disciplined or discharged except for
just cause, see Summers, lndi'dual Protecton Agarnrt Unjicri Disrmsal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 521-22, 523 (1976).
98. 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1981).
99. Set note 19 supra.
100. See note 19 supra.
101. 638 F.2d at 161.
102. Id
103. Id at 161-62.
104. Id
105. Id at 162.
106. See note 19 supra.
107. 638 F.2d at 163.
108. Even in the absence of an express no-strike clause, a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration clause will be read to prohibit strikes. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
It is argued that there could be no violation [of the collective bargaining agreement by
striking] in the absence of a no-strike clause in the contract explicitly covering the
subject of the dispute over which the strike was called. We disagree.
The collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty
of submitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration. In a consistent
course of decisions the Courts of Appeals of at least five Federal Circuits have held
that a strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall
be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of
the agreement.
ld at 104-05 (footnote omitted).
109. 638 F.2d at 164.
1982]
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Gould and the manufacturing division of the union, the no-strike clause was
not in effect.
The issue in Gould, as differentiated from that in BuJalo Forge v. Unted
Steelworkers," 10 was whether "an employee has the right to honor the lawful
picket line of his own union which is set up at his employer's place of busi-
ness but is directed at a stranger employer doing work on the premises." I I
To deny this right, in the court's opinion, would be to hold that "although
Congress protected the fundamental right of labor organizations to engage
in primary picketing, it withheld this protection from the normal employee
response which makes this right effective."' 
12
G. Successor Employer; Alter Ego
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Board's orders in NLRB
v. Tricor Products, Inc. 13 and Sturdevant Sheet Metal & Roofing Co. A NLRB. 114
The two businesses, found to be alter egos of predecessor employers, were
ordered by the Board to adhere to and work under the collective bargaining
agreements of their predecessor employers. In both cases, the same individu-
als were involved in the management of new companies in which the work
force was substantially identical." '5 Even if the old and the new companies
are separate legal entities and such a change is economically motivated, if
the new business is the alter ego of the old, the former collective bargaining
commitments must be upheld."
16
H. Union's Duty of Fair Representation
At issue in Denver Stereotypers & Electrotypers Local 13 v. NLRB" 7 was
whether the Board was entitled to infer bad faith from the union's interpre-
tation of its constitution and bylaws. In 1973, the Denver Stereotypers and
Electrotypers Union (Stereotypers Union) had negotiated a multiemployer
agreement governing stereotypers of the Denver Post, Inc. (Post) and the
Rocky Mountain News (News)." t8 The grievant, Paul Simonette, was as-
signed a position in the street circulation department of the News after its
stereotyping department was discontinued. The Denver Newspaper Guild
(Guild) represented the street circulation department employees, and
Simonette applied for union membership. After a discharge due to physical
injuries, Simonette contacted the Guild, but since he had not become a per-
110. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
111. 638 F.2d at 163.
112. Id (quoting West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 820, 823 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 902
(4th Cir. 1953)). The Tenth Circuit also upheld the Board's decision not to defer to the arbitra-
tor's award. The arbitrator had not addressed the legality of the walkout, and "where an arbi-
trator's award clearly ignores a long line of Board and court precedent, the Board's refusal to
defer under Spitberg [Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955)] is proper." 638 F.2d
at 166-67.
113. 636 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980).
114. 636 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Id at 274; 636 F.2d at 269.
116. 636 F.2d at 269-70; 636 F.2d at 273-74.
117. 623 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1980).
118. Id at 134.
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manent employee in the bargaining unit, that union could not aid him in his
employment problem." 19 He contacted the Stereotypers Union and re-
quested that his name be put on a list as a substitute stereotyper for the
Post. 120
Since Simonette had first worked within Stereotypers Union jurisdiction
in 1971, his name could have been placed in the second highest position on
the substitute list.' 2' His name was placed at the bottom of the priority list,
however, and he filed a charge with the NLRB against the Stereotypers
Union. 122
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Stereotypers Union
had violated section 8(b)(1)(A)123 of the Act because its decision was tainted
with "dual unionism."' 24 The Board overturned this ruling because the is-
sue of "dual unionism" had never been raised. 125 Nevertheless, the Board
concluded that the Stereotypers Union had violated its duty of fair represen-
tation 26 because Simonette's placement on the list was directly contrary to
his contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 12 7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that holding union officials to
a "standard of skill in interpreting legal documents akin to that possessed by
the Board" was error.1 28 The officers believed the local constitution and
bylaws did not apply to the situation at hand;' 29 the court did not find evi-
dence that the union's interpretation of its rules was influenced by animus
toward Simonette, and it denied enforcement of the Board's order.'130 Judge
McKay dissented, expressing his dissatisfaction with the process of having so
many tribunals review administrative disputes. He stated that the proper
procedure would be to return the case to the factfinders to determine if the
post-interpretation conduct of the Stereotypers Union officers was sufficient
to support the inference that the officers acted in bad faith toward
Simonette. 131
In an unpublished opinion, Vzck v. United Transportation Union,132 the
Tenth Circuit considered a union's breach of its duty of fair representation.
Characterizing the action as a tort, the court found that the New Mexico
119. Id
120. Id at 135.
121. Id at 134-36.
122. Id. at 136.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1l)(A) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. See note 19
Sapra.
124. 623 F.2d at 136.
125. Id
126. Section 7 says nothing about an employee's right to be represented fairly. See note 19
supra. By judicial fiat, however, a duty has been imposed on a union to represent the employees
in its bargaining unit in a fair, non-arbitrary, and non-discriminatory fashion. See Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
127. 623 F.2d at 136.
128. Id at 137.
129. Id at 138.
130. Id
131. Id at 138 (McKay, J., dissenting).
132. No. 79-2234 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
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three-year statute of limitations for torts barred the suit.' 33 The plaintiff-
appellant, Jennings Vick, had been employed by the Santa Fe Railroad as a
brakeman. The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time set a
deadline for contesting grievances regarding seniority. 134 Since Vick did not
bring his claim before the Railroad Adjustment Board, as he was entitled to
do, the doctrine of laches also applied.'
35
II, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
In an action arising under the Railway Labor Act,' 36 Eason v. Frontier Air
Lines, Inc. ,137 the plaintiff, after suffering a back injury, filed for compensa-
tion under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.' 38 Subsequently,
the plaintiff brought suit against his union because his grievance was not
processed and against his employer because he had not been assigned to do
"light duty" after an earlier back injury.' 39 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the exclusivity
of remedy provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.14° The union's
processing of the grievance would have been useless because recovery against
the employer was barred by the statute.'
4'
Another workmen's compensation case, Davidson v. Hobart Corp. ,142
presented the issue of whether individual members of a corporation's board
of directors are "employees" under the Workmen's Compensation Act'
43
and therefore immune from liability. In determining the issue, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i]t would be an anomalous contraven-
tion of the workmen's compensation scheme to remove personal liability
from executive officers, supervisors, and all other workers, while leaving the
directors personally liable for damages arising from an employee's in-
jury."' 44 The court found language in the statute treating the employer and
those performing work for the employer as a "single economic unit,"' 45 and
held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Workmen's Compen-
sation Act barred a common-law negligence suit against members of the em-
ployer corporation's board of directors.146
133. Id at 5.
134. Id
135. Id at 4.
136. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
137. 636 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1981).
138. Id at 294. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to -54-127 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
139. 636 F.2d at 294.
140. Id
141. Id at 294-95.
142. 643 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1981).
143. In this case, the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act was at issue. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-501 to -573 (1973). Section 44-501 provides that "no employer, or other employee of such
employee, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under this act





III. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 14 7
Walter Kelbach, an inmate of the Utah State Penitentiary, filed an ap-
plication for social security disability benefits under sections 416(i) (1) (A) and
423(d)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act. 14 ' He claimed that he had become
disabled and unable to work as a result of a "mental disorder" and that he
had "earned" less than $100 in 1976 and less than $100 in 1977.'
4 9
In affirming the trial court's denial of the claim, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that even if Kelbach could prove the requisite disa-
bility that would qualify him for benefits, he was not entitled to the benefits
of the Social Security Act because he was not "in need."' 50 The eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution protects against cruel and un-
usual punishment and has been interpreted to obligate the states to furnish
their prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
medical care, and personal safety.' 5 ' Nothing in the record indicated
Kelbach lacked any of these provisions.' 52 Thus, the denial was proper.
IV. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
15 3
In Schoenhals v. Cockrum, 154 the court of appeals reversed a finding by the
lower court that the defendant, Cockrum, was a retail or service establish-
ment and therefore exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).' 55 The court noted that Cockrum's business of providing an inven-
tory service to other commercial wholesale and retail businesses was "by its
very nature one which the consuming public would never use in the course
of its daily living. . ." and therefore could not qualify for the retail business
exemption of the FLSA.'
56
In Harding v. Kurco, Inc. ,57 ten former employees of Kurco, Inc.'s
(Kurco) dance studio sought backpay under the FLSA based on Kurco's
failure to pay the minimum wage and overtime. Kurco claimed its business
was not in interstate commerce, a requirement for FLSA jurisdiction. How-
ever, Kurco, as a franchisee of Fred Astaire Dance Studios, encouraged par-
ticipation in national dance competitions and pleasure trips by the
instructors and students. This participation, according to the court, pro-
vided the necessary interstate commerce activities.' 5 8 Thus, the requirement
for FLSA jurisdiction was met.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306, 401-433, 501-504, 601-676, 701-716, 901-909, 1101-1108, 1201-
1206, 1301-1324, 1351-1355, 1381-1383, 1391-1397 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
148. Kelbach v. Harris, 634 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1980).
149. Id at 1306-07.
150. Id at 1311.
151. Id
152. Id
153. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
154. 647 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1981).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976) exempts retail or service establishments from the requirements
of FLSA.
156. 647 F.2d at 1081.
157. 650 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1981).
158. Kurco contended it did not have the interstate contacts required for application of the
FLSA. The FLSA, as amended, applies to any business which has employees engaged in inter-
state commerce. Id at 229.
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V. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 15 9
Two cases were brought before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dur-
ing the past year seeking review of orders of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), Austin Building Co. v. OSHRC' 6° and
Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. OSHRC.' 6 1 Both were decided based on the
Un'versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 162 standard of whether the Commission's
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record when
considered as a whole. After a careful examination of the contentions of the
companies which the Commission had found to be in violation of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act regulations, the court held in both cases that
the Commission's finding of facts were conclusive. The trial courts' decisions
were upheld. '
63
VI. EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)164
The eligibility of employers, who contributed on their own behalf to a
pension fund covered by ERISA, to receive pension benefits from that fund
was the issue addressed in Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the International Brother-
hood of Painters.165 Two employers were denied their claims for pension ben-
efits by their pension fund administrator because they were not
"employees."' 66 The claimants brought suit in federal district court and
were awarded pension benefits and attorneys' fees following a jury verdict in
their favor. 167
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Paris v. Profit Sharing
Plan 168 and Aitken v. IP & GCU-Employee Retirement Fund,169 stated that the
fund administrator's denial of claims must be upheld unless "(1) arbitrary or
capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a
question of law." 1 70 The administrator's decision was upheld.
Both claimants, Peckham and Woolum, were signatories to a collective
bargaining agreement, and the pension fund in question was set up to bene-
fit employees represented by the collective bargaining representative.
Peckham and Woolum, as self-employed sole proprietors, were excluded spe-
cifically by terms of the pension fund.
1 7'
The appeals court disagreed that the appellees were "dual status em-
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
160. 647 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1981).
161. 648 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
163. 648 F.2d at 1282; 647 F.2d at 1069.
164. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086, 1101-1144, 1201-1242, 1301-1381 (1976).
165. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
166. Id. at 425-26.
167. Id. at 426.
168. 637 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
169. 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
170. 653 F.2d at 426.
171. Id. at 426-27. Self-employed individuals were specifically excluded. Id. at 427.
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ployer-employees." Based on specific language in ERISA 172 and its legisla-
tive history, 1 73 and on rules and regulations of the Secretary of Labor, 174 the
court held that the claimants were ineligible to receive pension benefits. 175
The case was remanded with directions to the district court to decide
whether the claimants should be repaid their fund contributions and
whether an award of attorneys' fees would be proper.1
76
Christine K. Truitt
172. Set 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1976).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., rtpnhnedih [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4698; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Ses., repnhted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4838, 4851.
174. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 to .3(c)(1) (1980).
175. Id. at 427-28.
176. Id. at 428.
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